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II. Vileness Factor
Although preferably addressed on appeal rather than on mandatory
review, the issue of Virginia's application of its "vileness" factorremains
suspect. 23 In Smith v. Commonwealth, the Virginia Supreme Court said
that an "aggravated battery" was a battery "which qualitatively and
quantitatively, is more culpable to accomplish an act of murder.
' 24
The Murphy and Chabrol courts' use of this definition as a narrow-
ing construction of the unconstitutionally vague statutory language
25
continues to be questionable. One construction might be more accept-
able if the court concentrated on its interpreted requirement of a quali-
tatively more culpable battery rather than a purely quantitative ap-
proach. The qualitative method focuses on a heightened degree of
individual culpability involved in the manner of the killing. The
quantitative test is little more than a "one-shot, two-shot," rule that
distinguishes arbitrarily between life and death.
In both of these cases the court looked to the quantitative standard.
In Murphy, the court held "that the evidence was more than sufficient to
support the trial court's finding that Murphy had committed a battery to
the victim which was more than the minimum necessary to accomplish
the act of murder."'26 In Chabrol, the court found that"... [s]uch conduct
22 See Dubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993) and
case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
23 See Lago, Litigating the Vileness Factor, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 4, No. 1, p. 24 (1991).
24 219 Va. at 478, 248 S.E.2d at 149.
25 SeeArave v. Creech, 113 S. Ct. 2680 (1993), and case summary
of Arave, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
26 Murphy, 246 Va. at 144, 431 S.E.2d at 52.
27 Chabrol, 245 Va. at 334,427 S.E.2d at 378. The Chabrol court
far exceeded the minimum battery necessary to accomplish an act of
murder."27
III. Differences Between Mandatory Review and Appeal
The differences between appeal and mandatory review also sug-
gest implications for the attorney - client relationship. Murphy was able
to bring many more issues to the attention of the Supreme Court of
Virginia than was Chabrol. Although Mr. Chabrol's attorney did
everything possible to convince his client to appeal, his failure to do so
underscores the paramount importance of developing a good relation-
ship with the client at an early stage. The Virginia Code of Professional
Responsibility requires the attorney to accept the decision of the client
about pleas, but a close working relationship established early may help
the client accept the advice of counsel at critical points in the case.28 As
it stands, we will never know whether Andrew Chabrol was executed
under an unconstitutional application of Virginia's capital murder scheme.
Summary and analysis by:
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also found that there had been psychological and physical torture. Had
the court previously offered a definite construction of the statutory term,
"torture," so that attorneys could defend against it, it would have been
constitutionally acceptable. See Lankford v. Idaho, 111 S. Ct. 1723
(1991) and case summary of Lankford, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 4,
No. 1, p. 9 (1991); andDubois v. Commonwealth, 435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va.
1993) and case summary of Dubois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
28 Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility, EC 7-7.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The number of Virginia capital defendants who oppose presenta-
tion of evidence in mitigation or who plead guilty, or both, appears to be
increasing.1 Instances involving capital defendants who offer little or no
cooperation or who actually obstruct defense counsel in preparation and
presentation of mitigation are less visible, but probably arise even more
frequently. Examination of legal and ethical issues raised by these
situations provides another important example of why "death is differ-
ent."
The trial of a capital defendant is divided into two phases. At the
first phase, a determination of guilt is made. If the defendant is found
guilty, then a second separate proceeding follows to determine the
1 See, e.g., DuBois v. Commonwealth,435 S.E. 2d 636 (Va. 1993)
and case summary of DuBois, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Murphy
v. Commonwealth, 246 Va. 136,431 S.E.2d 48 (1993) and case summary
of Murphy, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Chabrol v. Common-
wealth, 245 Va. 327, 427 S.E.2d 374 (1993) and case summary of
Chabrol, Capital Defense Digest, this issue; Davidson v. Common-
wealth, 244 Va. 129, 419 S.E.2d 656 (1992) and case summary of
Davidson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 33 (1992).
sentence to be imposed. At the penalty trial, both the prosecution and the
defense may present evidence as to the propriety of the imposition of a
sentence of death. The prosecution will seek to prove and emphasize the
existence of aggravating factors justifying the imposition of the death
penalty. Conversely, the defense has the opportunity to present evidence
of mitigating circumstances to persuade the jury to impose a life
sentence.
If the defendant entered a guilty plea, the penalty phase may be the
first and only opportunity the defense will have to educate the sentencer,
whether judge or jury, about the defendant. Even if the defendant was
found guilty of capital murder after a full trial, the penalty phase will
provide the defense with an opportunity to focus the jury's attention on
the defendant solely as aperson.2 Mitigation may include evidence about
2 Defense counsel should, however, recognize that the defendant's
demeanor during the guilt phase could adversely affect the jury's
impressions before the penalty trial begins. See, e.g., Riggins v. Nevada,
112 S. Ct. 1810, 1819-20 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing
Geimer & Amsterdam, Why Jurors Vote Life or Death: Operative
Factors in Ten Florida Death Penalty Cases, 15 Am. J. Crim. L. 1, 51-
53 (1987-1988)).
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the defendant's character, personality, education, and family. Thus,
defense evidence offered at the penalty phase will necessarily be pre-
sented in a tone and context different from that of the guilt phase.
Because of the importance of the evidence offered by the defense at
the penalty phase, defense counsel must gain the complete trust and
cooperation of the capital defendant from the moment counsel is retained
or appointed. The investigation for possible mitigating evidence should
begin immediately. Defense counsel should advise the defendant of the
importance of mitigation and the need for the defendant's full coopera-
tion in obtaining the necessary facts and information to assist in the
development of a case in mitigation.3 There is, however, a possibility
that the defendant will think defense counsel is giving up on presenting
a defense at the guilt phase by asking for cooperation with the penalty
phase investigation. This situation poses a delicate question and counsel's
explanation may strongly impact the attorney/client relationship. Coun-
sel must advise the defendant that there is no break between the penalty
and guilt phases of the trial, so there will be no opportunity to investigate
mitigation evidence later, after the guilt phase. If the defendant is made
to understand the crucial nature of developing mitigation evidence and
offers his complete assistance, then defense counsel's job will be much
easier.
But what if the defendant refuses to cooperate in developing
mitigating evidence? The defendant may say, "walk me or fry me," that
is, either win an acquittal or ask the court to impose the death penalty. Or
the defendant may advise defense counsel at the outset that he wishes to
plead guilty to the charge and accept whatever punishment the court
imposes. Perhaps the defendant may even express a desire to be put to
death. The defendant may further instruct defense counsel not to prepare
or present a case in mitigation. Under these circumstances, what is
defense counsel's obligation to develop and present mitigating evidence
despite a defendant's request to the contrary? This article will explore
these problems and suggest solutions and alternatives in light of defense
counsel's obligations to the defendant, the bar and the courts. Specifi-
cally, this article will examine whether there are constitutional or
statutory requirements for presenting mitigating evidence and whether
defense counsel has a separate professional and ethical obligation to
present such evidence despite the defendant's instructions to the con-
trary. In addition, this article will focus on the consequences of failing
to present mitigating evidence.
II. BASIC HISTORY OF MITIGATION
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court ruled that the death
penalty, as it was being imposed at that time, constituted cruel and
3 See generally Gary Goodpaster, The Trial for Life: Effective
Assistance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, 58 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 299
(1983).
4 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, reh'g denied, 409 U.S. 902
(1972).
5 See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 875
(1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976); Jurekv. Texas, 428 U.S.
262 (1976).
6 At the time these statutes were approved, the Supreme Court also
struck down mandatory death sentences, citing, inter alia, the failure of
such schemes to permit the sentencer to consider "the diverse frailties of
humankind." Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976).
7 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 192-97.
8 Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978) (specifically reaffirmed in
Hitchcock v. Dugger, 481 U.S. 393 (1987)).
9 See, e.g., Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Skipper v.
South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1 (1986); see also California v. Brown, 479
U.S. 538 (1987); and Welsh S. White, TheDeath Penalty in the Nineties
97-100 (1991).
10 California v. Brown, 479 U.S. 538, 541 (1987) (quoting
unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution.4 The Court's basic concern was that death sentences
were being arbitrarily imposed by judges and juries with unfettered
discretion. State legislatures responded by enacting death penalty
statutes to resolve these problems. In 1976, the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of revised death penalty statutes in Georgia,
Texas and Florida.5 These statues provided for separate guilt and
sentencing proceedings which would allow the sentencer to make an
individualized determination as to the imposition of the death pen-
alty.6 In addition, the statutes established separate aggravating factors
to be found and weighed against any mitigating evidence before
imposing a sentence of death.7 Virginia adopted a combination of the
Texas and Georgia schemes.
In 1978, the Supreme Court held that the nature of the mitigating
evidence presented during the penalty phase could not be limited.8 In
other words, while a statute may enumerate aggravating factors to be
considered by a sentencer, it may not limit the mitigating factors to be
considered. The Court has continued to uphold the flexibility of
mitigation evidence in subsequent decisions. 9 In addition, the Court
has stated that the consideration of mitigating evidence is "a 'consti-
tutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of
death."' 10
III. ARETHERE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
REQUIREMENTS FOR PRESENTING MITIGATING
EVIDENCE?
There have been no direct constitutional or statutory rulings on
whether mitigation evidence is indispensable in a capital trial. How-
ever, the line of capital cases decided by the United States Supreme
Court since 1976 tends to support the argument that the increased
reliability necessary to a constitutional death penalty requires the
presentation of mitigating evidence. Case decisions from the various
states allowing capital punishment also reflect this debate. In addition,
the statutory scheme in Virginia actually appears to emphasize the role
of mitigation, although the subject is seldom addressed explicitly.
A. Constitutional Requirements
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that a capital defen-
dant may make a knowing, intelligent and voluntary waiver of his right
to appeal. 11 However, the Court has never ruled whether a defendant
may choose to withhold all mitigating evidence from a sentencer. 12 In
a dissent to the denial of a stay of execution in Lenhard v. Wolff,
13
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976)).
11 See Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012 (1976); Whitmore v.
Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990). However, thirty-six of the thirty-seven
states allowing the death penalty impose an automatic review of some
form. And some state courts refuse to allow capital defendants to waive
appeal. See Laura A. Rosenwald, Death Wish: What Washington Courts
Should Do When a Capital Defendant Wants to Die, 68 Wash. L. Rev.
735 (1993) [hereinafter Rosenwald, Death Wish].
12 See Rosenwald, Death Wish, supra note 11. In Burger v. Kemp,
483 U.S. 776 (1987), the defendant did not specifically request that
defense counsel not present mitigating evidence. However, the Supreme
Court held that defense counsel did not deprive the defendant of effective
assistance of counsel by not presenting mitigating evidence because
counsel had tactical reasons for not doing so. In addition, the Court said
that although counsel could have done a more thorough investigation for
mitigation, "we address not what is prudent or appropriate but only what
is constitutionally compelled." Id. at 794 (citing U.S. v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
748 (1984)).
13 444 U.S. 807, reh'g denied, 444 U.S. 1301 (1979).
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Justice Marshall summarized the role of mitigation evidence as a
procedural requirement before the imposition of death and went on to
evaluate the impact of allowing a defendant not to introduce mitigating
evidence:
The sentencing court deprived itself of the very evidence that
this Court has deemed essential to the determination whether
death was the appropriate sentence. We can have no assur-
ance that the death sentence would have been imposed if the
sentencing tribunal had engaged in the careful weighing
process that was held to be constitutionally required in Gregg
v. Georgia and its progeny. This Court's toleration of the
death penalty has depended on its assumption that the penalty
will be imposed only after a painstaking review of aggravating
and mitigating factors. In this case, that assumption has
proved demonstrably false. Instead, the Court has permitted
the State's mechanism of execution to be triggered by an
entirely arbitrary factor: the defendant's decision to acqui-
esce in his own death. In my view, the procedure the Court
approves today amounts to nothing less than state-adminis-
tered suicide.1
4
Although the Court has never held that a capital defendant has the
right to knowingly and voluntarily waive the right to present mitigating
evidence at the penalty phase, Justice Marshall's well-reasoned dissent
in Lenhard, as well as the Court's basic pronouncement on the enhanced
reliability required in capital cases, 15 gives strong credence to an
argument that presentation of mitigating evidence is already a Constitu-
tional requirement under the Court's prior holdings.
B. The Issue in Other Jurisdictions
In the absence of a definitive United States Supreme Court holding,
courts have engaged in spirited debate over the necessity of mitigating
evidence. Some have concluded that mitigating evidence is not consti-
tutionally required.
A series of California cases has addressed the issue of the duty of
counsel to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase despite the
defendant's instructions to the contrary. In People v. Deere (Deere I), 16
the defendant barred his attorney from presenting mitigating evidence at
the penalty phase. Instead, the defendant gave a simple statement to the
court that he felt he should die for his crimes. The California Supreme
Court held that the defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel
and concluded that imposing the death penalty without considering any
mitigating evidence was improper:
To allow a capital defendant to prevent the introduction of
mitigating evidence on his behalf withholds from the trier of
14 Id. at 815 (footnote omitted).
15 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280,305 (1976) (holding
that "the penalty of death is qualitatively different from a sentence of
imprisonment, however long.... Because of that qualitative difference,
there is a corresponding difference in the need for reliability in the
determination that death is the appropriate punishment in a specific
case.").
16 710 P.2d 925 (Cal. 1985).
17 Id. at 931.
18 774 P.2d 698 (Cal. 1989).
19 See Bonnie, TheDignityofthe Condemned, 74Va. L. Rev. 1363,
1382-89 (1988).
20 782 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1989).
21 808 P.2d 1181 (Cal. 1991).
fact potentially crucial information bearing on the penalty
decision no less than if the defendant was himself prevented
from introducing such evidence by statute or judicial ruling.
In either case the state's interest in a reliable penalty determi-
nation is defeated.
7
Four years later, in People v. Bloom, 18 the California Supreme
Court disapproved, but did not overrule, Deere I in a case involving a
pro se capital defendant who withheld mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase of trial. The court concluded that the failure to present
potentially mitigating evidence at the penalty phase did not automati-
cally render the imposition of the death penalty unreliable. TheBloom
court went on to note that commentators have criticized any require-
ment that defense counsel present mitigating evidence over a client's
objections and even cited a Virginia Law Review article to that
effect. 19
The subsequent California case of People v. Lang20 and a second
appeal of People v. Deere2 1 further undermined the original holding
in Deere I. Specifically, the court held that under the invited-error
doctrine, "a defendant who insists that mitigating evidence not be
presented at the penalty phase is estopped from later claiming ineffec-
tive assistance based on counsel's acquiescence in his wishes."
'22
Otherjurisdictions have also addressed the effect of a defendant's
decision not to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.
23
In State v. Dodd,24 the Washington Supreme Court recently faced this
problem in the context of its mandatory review of the death sentence.
Washington's statute is very similar to Virginia's in that it requires a
determination "[w]hether the sentence of death is excessive or dispro-
portionate to the penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both
the crime and the defendant."'25 Despite the fact that the defendant in
Dodd presented no mitigating evidence, the court conducted its man-
datory review and upheld the sentence.26 However, in a stinging
dissent, two justices pointed to the fundamental problems in allowing
a defendant to choose not to present mitigating evidence and to waive
appeal:
Mr. Dodd's wishes, while entitled to some weight, are not
determinative. Our death penalty statute requires us to
review every death sentence on the record. In addition,
there are several important policy reasons why allowing
Dodd to waive his general appeals would be unwise. First,
there is the possibility that Dodd may change his mind
between now and the execution. Second, society has a
significant interest in the nonarbitrary application of
the death penalty. To give paramount weight to Mr.
Dodd's desires would, in effect, mean that the State is
participating in Mr. Dodd's suicide.27
22 Id. at 1189.
23 See, e.g., Hamblen v. State, 527 So.2d 800 (Fla. 1988) and Pettit
v. State, 591 So.2d 618 (Fla. 1992) (holding that a competent defendant
may waive the right to present mitigating evidence in a Florida sentenc-
ing proceeding); see also Singleton v. Lockhart, 962 F.2d 1315 (8th Cir.
1992) (holding that a defendant may make a knowing, intelligent waiver
of his right to present mitigating evidence).
24 838 P.2d 86 (Wash. 1992).
25 Wash. Rev. Code § 10.95.130 (West 1990).
26 For a resounding criticism of the court's ruling, see Rosenwald,
Death Wish, supra note 11.
27 Dodd, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
28 Id. at 107-10. The dissent based its conclusion on the decisions
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In addition, the dissent looked to the requirements of the Eighth
Amendment and found a constitutional mandate for denying a
defendant's request not to present mitigating evidence.
23
C. Virginia Law
The Supreme Court of Virginia has never addressed the effect of a
defendant's demand that no mitigation evidence be offered during the
penalty phase of trial. There is no explicit statutory requirement in
Virginia that defense counsel present mitigating evidence at the penalty
phase of a capital murder trial, nor has the Supreme Court of Virginia
imposed such a requirement. However, Virginia Code section 17-110.1
does establish guidelines for the court's mandatory review of the sen-
tence of death: "In addition to consideration of any errors in the trial
enumerated by appeal, the court shall consider and determine: . . .
whether the sentence of death is excessive or disproportionate to the
penalty imposed in similar cases, considering both the crime and the
defendant." 29
By refusing to allow defense counsel to present mitigating evidence
at the penalty phase, a defendant thwarts the supreme court's statutory
obligations under section 17.110.1. If a defendant offers no mitigating
evidence, the supreme court will know little or nothing about the
defendant's background, education, personality, intelligence, or other
circumstances. If no mitigating evidence is presented at the penalty trial,
the supreme court can hardly comply with its statutory duty to consider
both the crime and the defendant in determining whether the sentence of
death is "excessive or disproportionate to the penalty imposed in similar
cases."
30
The Supreme Court of Virginia has held that a capital defendant is
prohibited from waiving the mandatory review of a death sentence.
31
Therefore, under section 17.110.1, there arises a necessary duty for
defense counsel to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase in
order to provide to the supreme court the necessary information with
which to fulfill its statutory obligation. Thus, because a Virginia capital
defendant cannot waive review of a death sentence, a Virginia capital
defendant should not be allowed to waive his case in mitigation.
Further, under this interpretation of section 17.110.1, if a capital
defendant instructs his attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the
penalty phase and such evidence is, in fact, not presented, but then
defendant decides to appeal, defendant may raise two additional issues.
First, the defendant can argue that his attorney had a duty under section
17.110.1 to present mitigating evidence despite the defendant's instruc-
tions to the contrary. Defense counsel's failure to comply with this duty,
therefore, denies defendant his right to effective assistance of counsel.
Second, the defendant can argue that the trial court erred by not requir-
ing defendant's counsel to present mitigating evidence pursuant to the
duty established by section 17.110.1.
of the United States Supreme Court in Furman, Gregg, and the Lockett
line of cases. See infia notes 3-8.
29 Va. Code Ann. § 17.110.1C.2. (1990) (emphasis added).
30 Id.
31 See, e.g., Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129, 132,419
S.E.2d 656,658 (1992) and case summary of Davidson, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 5, No. I, p. 33 (1993); see also Kathleen L. Johnson, The
Death Row Right to Die: Suicide or Intimate Decision?, 54 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 575, 579-83 (1981). Appellate courts in other states have made
similar rulings with regard to their mandatory appeal statutes. See, e.g.,
Commonwealth v. McKenna, 383 A.2d 174 (Pa. 1978); Goode v. State,
IV. ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
When a client in effect "chooses to die" by instructing defense
counsel not to investigate or present mitigating evidence, the attorney is
faced with a number of ethical dilemmas.32 The following discussion
offers guidance from the various applicable codes of professional re-
sponsibility. More specifically, they suggest authority to act for any
defense counsel who wants to defend her client.
A. Virginia Code of Professional Responsibility
The Commonwealth of Virginia, with some modification, has
basically adopted the American Bar Association's Model Code of
Professional Responsibility. A number of its disciplinary rules and
ethical considerations give support and guidance to the defense attorney
seeking to investigate and present mitigating evidence despite a client's
failure to cooperate or instructions to the contrary.
Canon 7, of course, obliges counsel to zealously represent her client
within the bounds of the law. Under DR 7-101, an attorney is required
to "seek the lawful objectives of his client":
DR 7-101. Representing a Client Zealously.-(A) A
lawyer shall not intentionally:
(1) Fail to seek the lawful objectives of his client through
reasonably available means permitted by law and the Disci-
plinary Rules, except as provided by DR 7-101(B)....
(B) In his representation of a client, a lawyer may:
(1) With the express or implied authority of his client,
exercise his professional judgment to limit or vary his
client's objectives and waive or fail to assert a right or
position of his client.
Avoiding the death penalty is unquestionably a lawful objective.
But if the defendant has indicated a desire to be put to death, or a desire
simply to withhold mitigating evidence at the penalty phase, is avoiding
the death penalty a lawful objective of the client? As posited, arguably
not. But pose the question a different way: Is requesting defense counsel
to assist in killing the defendant a lawful objective? In essence, a
defendant who desires to be put to death and instructs counsel to withhold
mitigating evidence is doing just that-requesting his counsel to assist in
his suicide. Posited in that manner, defendant's request is arguably not
a lawful objective. Therefore, defense counsel arguably does not risk
violating DR 7-101 (A) (1) by presenting mitigating evidence despite her
client's instructions.
33
Even if presenting mitigating evidence were considered to violate
DR 7-101(A)(1), defense counsel may turn to the exception found in DR
7-101(B)(1). If defense counsel has implied authority from his client, he
365 So.2d 381 (Fla. 1978); People v. Stanworth, 457 P.2d 889 (Cal.
1969); Evans v. State, 361 So.2d 666 (Ala. 1978); State v.Dodd, 838 P.2d
86 (Wash. 1992).
3 2 See generallyWelsh S. White, TheDeath Penalty in theNineties
164-85 (1991).
33 For an opposing interpretation of DR 7-101 of the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility, see Linda E. Carter, Maintaining Sys-
temic Integrity in Capital Cases: The Use of Court-Appointed Counsel
to Present Mitigating Evidence When the Defendant Advocates Death,
55 Tenn. L. Rev. 95 (1987) [hereinafter Carter, Maintaining Systemic
Integrity].
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may exercise his independent professional judgment to vary the client's
lawful objectives. What constitutes "implied authority"? The Code
gives no guidance as to the meaning of "implied authority." Without
specific guidance, defense counsel could reasonably consider the totality
of the circumstances in which the capital defendant finds himself.
Defense counsel should observe the defendant's behavior, listen care-
fully to discern his true feelings about dying, consider the emotional
pressures faced by the defendant, and consider the defendant's possible
embarrassment, depression or bravado. Any inconsistencies in the
defendant's actions and words could be considered to invoke the "im-
plied authority" exception. Although DR 7-101(B) appears to contem-
plate variances in order to waive rights, not assert them, it could be argued
that anything short of continued, vocal, clear, in-court objections by the
client to the presentation of mitigating evidence constitutes "implied
authority."
Under EC 7-7, the client appears to be given some autonomy in
certain decisions:
EC 7-7.-In certain areas of legal representation not
affecting the merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing
the rights of a client, a lawyer is entitled to make decisions on
his own. But otherwise the authority to make decisions is
exclusively that of the client and, if made within the framework
of the law, such decisions are binding on his lawyer.... A
defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his
client fully on whether a particular plea to a charge appears to
be desirable and as to the prospects of success on appeal, but
it is for the client to decide what plea should be entered and
whether an appeal should be taken.
The client autonomy granted by EC 7-7, however, is ambiguous.
The only clear guidance given in the criminal context is the single
example that decisions on pleas and appeals are to be made in the sole
discretion of the client. The capital defense attorney should note a clear
caveat to this rule: Defense counsel has the continuing duty to advise his
client against pleading guilty without obtaining an agreement for a non-
capital disposition and sentence. If the client ignores this advice and
expresses a desire to plead guilty without such an agreement, it is highly
advisable to continue to advise the client on the subject in an attempt to
convince him to at least permit a defense.
34
The provisions of EC 7-11 and EC 7-12 are also relevant to the
capital defendant:
EC 7-11.-The responsibilities of a lawyer may vary
according to the intelligence, experience, mental condition or
age of a client, the obligation of a public officer, or the nature
of a particular proceeding. Examples include the representa-
tion of an illiterate or an incompetent,....
EC-12.-Any mental or physical condition of a client
that renders him incapable of making a considered judgment
on his own behalf casts additional responsibilities upon his
lawyer....
34 For examples of the many Virginia cases where pleas of guilty
resulted in the imposition of a death sentence, see DuBois v. Common-
wealth, 1993 Va. LEXIS 113 and case summary of DuBois, Capital
Defense Digest, this issue; Davidson v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 129,
419 S.E.2d 656 (1992) and case summary of Davidson, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 33 (1992); Savino v. Commonwealth, 239 Va.
534, 391 S.E.2d 276 (1990) and case summary of Savino, Capital
Defense Digest, Vol. 3, No. 1, p. 15 (1990); Stout v. Commonwealth, 237
Va. 126, 376 S.E.2d (1989) and case summary of Stout, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 1, No. 2, p. 4 (1989). Not coincidentally (but unfortunately),
Capital defense counsel will many times be faced with a client
whose capacities are limited as outlined in EC 7-11. For example, a
number of Virginia capital defendants have shown special disabilities,
such as being ajuvenile 35 or being mentally retarded. 36 Thenatureofthe
capital proceeding will also vary the lawyer's responsibilities. While no
guidance is given on how the responsibilities of the lawyer will vary, the
attorney should act in the best interests of the client taking into consid-
eration the totality of the client's circumstances, including the fact that
he is facing a capital charge.
As previously noted, a capital defendant suffers much mental pain
and anguish, with varying manifestations of embarrassment, depression,
sadness, anger, or bravado. A capital defendant's decision to seek the
death penalty and to withhold mitigating evidence at the penalty trial
actually exhibits a desire to commit state-assisted suicide. In other
contexts, the law considers suicidal tendencies, orbeing a danger to one's
self, as a significant factor in determining whether an individual should
be deprived of the autonomy to which he is otherwise entitled. If the
evidence of guilt in a particular capital case is strong, as it often is, the
defendant could not become much more suicidal than by refusing to
permit counsel to prepare and present mitigating evidence on his behalf.
B. American Bar Association Standards for
Criminal Justice
The American Bar Association Standards for Criminal Justice
provide some further support for imposing a duty upon defense counsel
to present mitigating evidence at the penalty phase. While these
Standards lack the mandatory nature of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility, their explicit principles of good practice point directly toward
defense counsel making every effort to present mitigating evidence.
Standard 4-4.1 deals with the duty to investigate:
Standard 4-4.1. Duty to Investigate
(a) Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investiga-
tion of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues
leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the
penalty in the event of conviction... The duty to investigate
exists regardless of the accused's admissions or statements to
defense counsel of facts constituting guilt or the accused's
stated desire to plead guilty. (emphasis added)
The accompanying comments note that "this standard contemplates...
that an attorney should vigorously seek to ascertain all mitigating
circumstances concerning the offense and characteristics of the defen-
dant."3
7
Standard 4-5.2 establishes the decisions which may be left to a
defendant after full consultation with counsel:
Standard 4-5.2. Control and Direction of the Case
(a) Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case
these are all cases where little or no mitigation was presented.
35 See, e.g., Wright v. Commonwealth, 245 Va. 177,427 S.E.2d 379
(1993) and case summary of Wright, Capital Defense Digest, this issue.
36 See, e.g., Washington v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 535, 323
S.E.2d 577 (1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1111 (1985); Mason v.
Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1091,254 S.E.2d 116, cert. denied, 444 U. S.
919 (1979).
37 ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Standard 4-4.1 cmt. (2d ed.
1980 & Supp. 1986) (emphasis added).
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are ultimately for the accused and others are ultimately for
defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made by the
accused after full consultation with counsel include:
(i) what pleas to enter;
(ii) whether to accept a plea agreement;
(iii) whether to waive jury trial;
(iv) whether to testify in his or her ownbehalf;
(v) whether to appeal.
(b) Strategic and tactical decisions should be made by
defense counsel after consultation with the client where
feasible and appropriate. Such decisions include what wit-
nesses to call, whether and how to conduct cross-examina-
tion, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should
be made, and what evidence should be introduced.
(emphasis added)
As opposed to EC 7-7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
Standard 4-5.2 gives much more guidance as to the identity of the
ultimate decisionmaker in specific circumstances in representing a
criminal defendant. Of particular help is the list of decisions that rest
exclusively with the client. In addition, the strategic and tactical
decisions specifically reserved for defense counsel, after consultation
with the client, include what evidence should be introduced. By limiting
the exclusive decisions of the client, and by placing the decisions on
evidence in the hands of defense counsel, this standard clearly places the
decision on presenting mitigating evidence with defense counsel. There
is no requirement that defense counsel defer to the wishes of the
defendant in such a situation. The standard simply requires that the
decision be made "after consultation with the client."
Standard 4-8.1 (b) provides the duties of defense counsel at sentenc-
ing: "Defense counsel should present to the court any ground which will
assist in reaching a proper disposition favorable to the accused.... This
standard is a clear mandate to present mitigating evidence on behalf of
the defendant. This duty is enhanced when the automatic review of a
death sentence requires considering the defendant, thereby requiring that
the appellate court have some specific information in the record about the
defendant. The appellate court will receive the information required only
if defense counsel presents mitigating evidence at the penalty trial.
Standard 18-6.3 requires that "the defense attorney should recog-
nize that the sentencing stage is the time at which for many defendants
the most important service of the entire proceeding can be performed."
This standard also establishes specific duties for defense counsel, includ-
ing:
The attorney should satisfy himself or herself that the factual
basis for the sentence will be adequate both for the purposes
of the sentencing court and, to the extent ascertainable, for the
purposes of subsequent dispositional authorities. The
attorney should take particular care to make certain that the
record of the sentencing proceedings will accurately reflect
all relevant mitigating circumstances relating either to the
offense or to the characteristics of the defendant which
were not disclosed during the guilt phase of the case and to
ensure that such record will be adequately preserved.
38 Examples of the types of information to be collected with regard
to the sentencing phase are contained in Paragraph 2.C. of Guideline
11.4.1:
C. collect information relevant to the sentencing phase of
trial including, but not limited to: medical history (mental and
physical illness or injury, alcohol and drug use, birth trauma
and developmental delays); educational history (achieve-
ment, performance and behavior), special educational needs
(emphasis added)
Obviously, this standard recognizes the importance not only of
presenting mitigating evidence at the penalty proceeding, but also the
importance of having mitigating evidence in the record for review by the
appellate court. When coupled with the implied statutory duty placed
upon Virginia counsel under Virginia Code section 17.110.1, defense
counsel's duty to present mitigating evidence on behalf of the capital
defendant is solidified.
C. American Bar Association Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in
Death Penalty Cases
In 1989, the American Bar Association adopted Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Counsel in Death Penalty Cases.
These guidelines are specifically geared to capital defense and provide
detailed direction on developing and presenting the case in mitigation.
Guideline 11.4.1 establishes the need for early investigation of
mitigating evidence despite any objections by the client:
Guideline 11.4.1 Investigation
A. Counsel should conduct independent investigations re-
lating to the guilt/innocence phase and to the penalty phase of
a capital trial. Both investigations should begin immediately
upon counsel's entry into the case and should be pursued
expeditiously.
C. The investigation forpreparation of the sentencing phase
should be conducted regardless of any initial assertion by
the client that mitigation is not to be offered. This inves-
tigation should comprise efforts to discover all reasonably
available mitigating evidence and evidence to rebut any
aggravating evidence that may be introduced by the prosecu-
tor.
D. Sources of investigative information may include the
following:
2. The Accused:
B. explore the existence of other potential sources of
information relating to ... the presence or absence of any
aggravating factors under the applicable death penalty statute
and any mitigating factors 38;
3. Potential Witnesses:
B. witnesses familiar with ... possible mitigating
reasons for the offense(s), and/or other mitigating evidence to
show why the client should not be sentenced to death;
C. members of the victim's family opposed to having the
client killed.
(including cognitive limitations and learning disabilities);
military history (type and length of service, conduct, special
training); employment and training history (including skills
and performance, and barriers to employability); family and
social history (including physical, sexual oremotional abuse);
prior adult and juvenile record; prior correctional experience
(including conduct on supervision and in the institution,
education or training, and clinical services); and religious and
cultural influences.
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(emphasis added)
The above investigation standards clearly recognize the need to
establish a relationship with the defendant and to initiate investigation for
mitigating evidence as soon as possible. The guidelines also emphasize
that such investigation should be performed regardless of the expressed
wishes of the client at that time.
Guidelines 11.8.1 through 11.8.6 establish detailed obligations for
defense counsel at the sentencing phase:
Guideline 11.8.1 Obligation of Counsel at the Sentencing
Phase of Death Penalty Cases
Counsel should be aware that the sentencing phase of a death
penalty trial is constitutionally different from sentencing pro-
ceedings in other criminal cases.
Guideline 11.8.2 Duties of Counsel Regarding Sentencing
Options, Consequences and Procedures
D. Counsel should ensure that all reasonably available miti-
gating and favorable information consistent with the defense
sentencing theory is presented to the sentencing entity or
entities in the most effective possible way.
E. Counsel should develop a plan for seeking to avoid the
death penalty and to achieve the least restrictive and burden-
some sentencing alternative which can reasonably be ob-
tained.
Guideline 11.8.3 Preparation for the Sentencing Phase
A. ... [P]reparation for the sentencing phase, in the form of
investigation, should being immediately upon counsel's entry
39 Paragraph F. of Guideline 11.8.3 gives counsel guidance on
deciding what witnesses and evidence to use at the penalty phase:
F. In deciding which witnesses and evidence to prepare for
presentation at the sentencing phase, counsel should consider
the following:
1. Witnesses familiar with and evidence relating to the
client's life and development, from birth to the time of
sentencing, who would be favorable to the client, explicative
of the offense(s) for which the client is being sentenced, or
would contravene evidence presented by the prosecutor;
2. Expert witnesses to provide medical, psychological,
sociological or other explanations for the offense(s) for which
the client is being sentenced, to give a favorable opinion as to
the client's capacity for rehabilitation, etc. and/or to rebut
expert testimony presented by the prosecutor;
3. Witnesses with knowledge and opinions about the
lack of effectiveness of the death penalty itself;
4. Witnesses drawn from the victim's family or inti-
mates who are willing to speak against killing the client.
40 Paragraph B. of Guideline 11.8.6 lists the topics counsel should
consider presenting at the penalty phase; paragraphs C. and D. consider
the methods for presenting the evidence, including testimony of the
defendant:
B. Among the topics counsel should consider presenting
are:
1. Medical history (including mental and physical illness
or injury, alcohol and drug use, birth trauma and developmen-
tal delays);
2. Educational history (including achievement, perfor-
into the case. Counsel should seek information to present to
the sentencing entity or entities in mitigation or explanation of
the offense and to rebut the prosecution's sentencing case.
B. Counsel should discuss with the client early in the case
the sentencing alternatives available, and the relationship
between strategy for the sentencing phase and for the guilt/
innocence phase.
39
Guideline 11.8.6 The Defense Case at the Sentencing Phase
A. Counsel should present to the sentencing entity or enti-
ties all reasonably available evidence in mitigation unless
there are strong strategic reasons to forego some portion of
such evidence.
40
Again, these guidelines squarely emphasize the need for early
investigative action on the part of the attorney. In addition, the guidelines
stress the strategic nature of the presentation of mitigating evidence
during the sentencing phase. Further, these guidelines support the
proposition that strategic decisions, including the decisions on pre-
senting mitigating evidence, are within the province of defense
counsel.
With guidance from all of these ethical codes, defense attorneys
should become comfortable with initiating the case in mitigation
despite the client's initial feelings or instructions. Further, as the
investigation progresses and trial draws near, defense counsel should
remain in close contact with the client, encouraging the presentation
of the thoroughly prepared case in mitigation. Even if the client
persists in instructing defense counsel not to present mitigating evi-
dence, the ethical standards will permit, and may actually require, the
attorney to present the case in mitigation despite the client's desires.
4 1
mance and behavior), special educational needs (including
cognitive limitations and learning disabilities) and opportu-
nity or lack thereof;
3. Military service (including length and type of service,
conduct, and special training);
4. Employment and training history (including skills and
performance, and barriers to employability);
5. Family and social history (including physical, sexual
or emotional abuse, neighborhood surroundings and peer
influence); and other cultural or religion influence, profes-
sional intervention (by medical personnel, social workers, law
enforcement personnel, clergy or others) or lack thereof; prior
correctional experience (including conduct on supervision
and in institutions, education or training, and clinical ser-
vices);
6. Rehabilitative potential of the client;
7. Record of prior offenses (adult and juvenile), espe-
cially where there is no record, a short record, or a record of
non-violent offenses;
8. Expert testimony concerning any of the above and the
resulting impact on the client, relating to the offense and to the
client's potential at the time of sentencing.
C. Counsel should consider all potential methods for offer-
ing mitigating evidence to the sentencing entity or entities,
including witnesses, affidavits, reports (including, if appro-
priate, a defense presentence report which could include
challenges to inaccurate, misleading or incomplete informa-
tion contained in the official presentence report and/or offered
by the prosecution, as well as information favorable to the
client), letters and public records.
D. Counsel may consider having the client testify or speak
during the closing argument of the sentencing phase.
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V. THE CONSEQUENCES OF FAILING TO
PRESENT MITIGATING EVIDENCE AT
THE PENALTY PHASE
A recent Virginia case, Davidson v. Commonwealth42 illustrates
some of the problems that arise when a capital defendant instructs his
attorney not to present mitigating evidence at the sentencing phase.
On June 13, 1990, Mickey Wayne Davidson killed his wife and his two
teenage stepdaughters. Davidson pleaded guilty to three charges of
capital murder. Before accepting the guilty pleas, the trial court heard
witness testimony and considered numerous exhibits. The court also
examined Davidson and determined that he had made the guilty pleas
knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently.
At the penalty phase of Davidson's trial, Davidson's counsel
advised the court that Davidson had ordered him not to present any
mitigating evidence. Davidson testified under oath that he understood
his decision and that he did not want any mitigating evidence presented.
The Commonwealth presented an array of evidence in support of a
sentence of death. The court found that the evidence supported a finding
that Davidson's conduct satisfied the statutory "vileness" aggravating
factor and sentenced Davidson to death by order dated July 11, 1991.
Davidson's attorneys filed a timely notice of appeal, but Davidson
later requested permission to waive his appeal of right. After conducting
an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court found that Davidson had know-
ingly, voluntarily and intelligently waived his right to appeal. The
Supreme Court of Virginia proceeded to review Davidson's sentence
under the mandatory provisions of Virginia Code section 17-110.1.
Having no mitigating evidence with which to evaluate the defendant, the
supreme court upheld Davidson's death sentence on June 5, 1992.
Davidson was scheduled to be executed on August 20, 1992.
In August, 1992, after discussions with death row advocates, and
despite his several "knowing, voluntary and intelligent" waivers of
rights, Davidson decided to fight his death sentence. The circuit court
granted a stay of execution just two days before he was scheduled to
die.43 Davidson then changed his mind and requested a new execution
date. He was scheduled to be executed on February 3, 1993. On January
31, 1993, Davidson again changed his mind and requested a stay of
execution so he could pursue an appeal.44 Davidson was granted a stay
just hours before he was scheduled to die in the electric chair.45 In
August, 1993, Davidson filed a request to suspend his appeal and have
a new execution date set.
46
41 At least two alternatives have been proposed to prevent defense
counsel from being faced with the ethical dilemmas of presenting
mitigating evidence despite a client's wishes. First, separate counsel
could be appointed by the court to handle only the presentation of
mitigating evidence when the defendant advocates death:
The best accommodation of interests would be achieved
by appointing an attorney whose specific role is to present
mitigating evidence.... The appointment of an independent
attorney would avoid the conflicts in loyalties and roles
inherent in requiring the defendant's attorney to present
evidence counter to the defendant's position. It would further
preserve the roles of the other players in the courtroom.
Carter, Maintaining Systemic Integrity, supra note 33, at 149.
It is suggested that this appointment of separate counsel be made at
the first indication by either the defendant or his attorney that the
defendant desires not to present mitigating evidence. This will allow the
separate counsel ample time and opportunity to develop a proper case in
mitigation. Id. at 150-51.
Davidson's uncertainty regarding execution is now apparent. He
has changed his mind about being executed numerous times. His
indecision vividly illustrates the problems with any judicial determina-
tion at the trial or mandatory appeal stages that a defendant's decision not
to present mitigating evidence is made "knowingly, voluntarily and
intelligently." This kind of indecision ultimately results in harm to the
defendant, harm to the judicial system, and a waste of money and time.
The biggest problem faced by a defendant who changes his mind is that
any legal avenues open to help him will be severely limited because he
refused to have mitigating evidence presented at trial. Davidson's case
is a classic illustration of the need for defense counsel to recognize his
ethical duties to encourage defendants to support the presentation of
mitigating evidence, or to present such evidence despite a defendant's
instructions to the contrary.
VI. CONCLUSION
While there is no explicit constitutional or statutory mandate for
defense counsel to present mitigating evidence on behalf of a capital
defendant, the United States Supreme Court has consistently emphasized
the importance of mitigation to a constitutionally permissible death
penalty. Further, in Virginia, the legislature itself has imposed an
implied obligation on defense counsel and the trial court to see that
mitigation evidence is presented in order to comply with the require-
ments for mandatory review of any death sentence.
In addition to the suggested constitutional and statutory require-
ments for mitigation, the various standards of professional responsibility
actually authorize, permit, and encourage defense counsel to present
mitigating evidence despite a client's request to the contrary. For capital
defense counsel, the bottom line is really an individual issue of personal
and professional integrity. The job of defense counsel is to defend-
anything less than a complete defense, including mitigation, mocks the
very essence of that calling.
Defense counsel should make every effort to simply avoid the
dilemma presented by a client who fails to cooperate with mitigation.
The adage that "an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure"
certainly applies here. Every effort should be made by defense counsel
to see that the defendant understands the nature and importance of
mitigation. Counsel must keep in consistent, frequent contact with the
defendant, constantly explain the role of mitigation, and inform, or even
cajole, the defendant on the issue. However, if push comes to shove, and
The second suggested alternative involves the establishment of a
state procedure by which a trial court could obtain evidence of mitigation
even when the defendant desires not to present it. See Rosenwald, Death
Wish, supra note 11. Such a procedure would involve the appointment
of a third party to investigate, gather and present mitigating evidence to
the sentencer. This third party could be a social worker, another attorney,
or some neutral agency. Id. By having the court appoint a neutral third
party, the defendant's attorney would be insulated from any ethical
dilemmas or claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to
present mitigating evidence.
42 244 Va. 129,419 S.E.2d 656 (1992). See also case summary of
Davidson, Capital Defense Digest, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 33 (1992).
43 Condemned Killer Wins Stay of Execution, UPI, August 18,
1992, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
44 Condemned Man Flip-Flops, Seeks Stay, The Washington
Times, February 1, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
45 Killer of Wife, Stepdaughters is Granted Stay of Execution, The
Washington Post, February 4, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
46 Inmate Switches, Asks ForNew Execution Date, The Washing-
ton Times, September 12, 1993, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library.
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the client persists in refusing to cooperate, then defense counsel still has
a duty to find a way to defend. The dissenting opinion in Dodd stated
it well: "[S]ociety has a significant interest in the nonarbitrary applica-
tion of the death penalty."47 So does the legal profession.
47 Dodd, 838 P.2d at 101 (Utter, J., dissenting).
WHAT EVERY VIRGINIA CAPITAL DEFENSE ATTORNEY SHOULD KNOW
ABOUT THE FEDERAL DRUG KINGPIN STATUTE
BY: PAUL M. O'GRADY
I. INTRODUCTION
No person has been executed under a federal statute in the United
States since 1963, when authorities hanged Victor Feguer, a convicted
kidnapper, in Iowa. That is likely to change soon. Responding to ever
increasing public anxiety about drug related violence in the United
States, Congress, in one of its last acts before the 1988 elections,
amended section 848 of Title 21 of the United States Code. 21 U.S.C.
§ 848(e) exposes to the death penalty people involved in a "continuing
criminal enterprise"t who either commit murders or cause them to be
committed.2 The law also provides a possible sanction of death in cases
involving the drug-related homicide of a law enforcement officer. This
amendment is commonly referred to as the Federal Drug Kingpin statute,
though as shall be discussed infra, the reach of the statute extends beyond
drug kingpins.
When the 1988 amendments to section 848 were passed there were
a number of nominally capital federal crimes on the books.3 However,
the death sanction has not been imposed under these statutes since the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia,4 because
in light of Furman, the Justice Department has considered these statutes
1 A person is engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise or"CCE"
if: (1) she violates any provision of [Title 21, Chapter 13, "Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control," subchapter I (control and enforcement) or
subchapter II (import and export) of the United States Code], and (2) the
violation is a part of a continuing series of violations of [the above
statutory provisions] which are undertaken by such person in concert
with five or more other persons with respect to whom such person
occupies a position of organizer, a supervisory position, or any other
position of management, and from which such person obtains substantial
income or resources. 21 U.S.C. §848(c).
2 21 U.S.C. § 848(e)-(r)(1988). These sections will be referred to
hereinafter as "the Drug Kingpin Statute."
3 The general federal death penalty statute for murder is 18 U.S.C.
§ 1111 (b). Other statutes carrying a death penalty include: 18 U.S.C.
§ 34 (aircraft or motor vehicle destruction); 18 U.S.C. § 351 (assassina-
tion of high ranking government personnel); 18 U.S.C. § 794 (espio-
nage); 18 U.S.C. § 844 (using explosives that result in death); 18 U.S.C.
§ 1751 (assassination of President and the staff); 18 U.S.C. § 1992 (train
wrecking); 18 U.S.C. § 2381 (treason).
4 408 U.S. 238 (1972)(rnling that capital sentencing procedures
which create a substantial risk that punishment could be inflicted in an
arbitrary and capricious manner violate the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments).
5 In addition, many of the dormant federal death penalty crimes will
not be enforced because they violate Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977)(holding that the death penalty is disproportionate in a case where
a woman was raped but not killed). Coker has been interpreted as barring
the death penalty in cases where a murder was not committed.
A recent revision of the United States' Attorneys Manual suggests
unconstitutional, and therefore unenforceable, in their current form. 5
This act has been called a revival of the federal death penalty because,
while the death penalty provisions under 21 U.S.C. § 848 should not be
considered a prototype for a constitutionally unassailable death penalty
law, that statute does not carry many of the constitutional infirmities
which previous federal capital provisions contained, and therefore U.S.
Attorneys can pursue prosecutions under it.
6
Even given the few serious doubts about its constitutionality, the
Attorney General has approved death requests under section 848(e)
approximately twenty times, and has received only four death verdicts.
7
To put these statistics in context, it should be noted that there are more
than 1300 drug related homicides in the United States each year.8 There
are a number of explanations for why the statute has not been more
widely employed, but before delving into those reasons, the statute
should be analyzed.
II. A FEDERAL DEATH PENALTY FOR
"DRUG KINGPINS" (AND OTHERS)
The death penalty provision of section 848 reads as follows:
that the death penalty could be imposed under some of these statutes
(which do not otherwise violate Coker). The manual suggests that
prosecutors may be able to rehabilitate the death eligible offenses by
characterizing them as crimes against the United States. Such a charac-
terization would limit the death penalty to a small segment of federal
cases, and therefore would pass constitutional muster under Jurek v.
Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). See Sandra D. Jordon, Death For Drug
Related Killings: Revival of the Federal Death Penalty, 67 Chi.-Kent L.
Rev. 79, 86 n. 31 (1991).
6 For example, the Drug Kingpin statute of 1988 provides specific
statutory aggravating and mitigating factors as well as numerous other
procedural protections, unlike the general federal homicide statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1111, which gives the jury no guidance whatsoever: "[w]hoever
is guilty of murder in the first degree, shall suffer death unless the jury
qualifies its verdict by adding thereto 'without capital punishment', in
which event he shall be sentenced to imprisonment for life .... ." 18
U.S.C. § 1111 (b).
7 Three Richmond crack dealers were sentenced to death in Febru-
ary 1993 for a number of drug related killings. In 1991, David R.
Chandler, an Alabama marijuana dealer was sentenced to death.
Chandler's appeal is pending before the 11th Circuit. See Robert F.
Howe, U.S. Jury Orders Death For3 Va. Drug Dealers, Wash. Post, Feb.
17, 1993, at Al.
8 See, Edward Frost, Arbitrary Prosecution?: Alleged Drug King-
pin Challenges Constitutionality of Federal Death Penalty Law, ABA
Journal, Jan. 1992, at 30. Note also that although more than 200
executions have taken place since the death penalty was reinstated in
1976, there have only been thirty-four federal executions in our entire
history. See Betty Parham & Gerrie Ferris, Atlanta J.-Const., Mar. 15,
1993, at A2.
